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This paper uses the principal-agent theory to analytically investigate the optimal incen-
tive-based compensation contract that a processor should offer to a grower performing 
efforts in quantity and quality. In this process, we contribute to the substantive litera-
ture on multi-task principal-agent models by analyzing the quality-quantity trade-off 
and studying the implications of such a relationship in the principal-agent framework. 
One striking result of these effects is that, under appropriate incentive-based grower’s 
compensation, the processor may encourage grower’s effort in quality without crowding out 
grower’s effort in quantity. 
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  With the constant pressure to meet consumer demands and the need to be competi-
tive, quality is becoming a central point in the agri-food industry. As a result, in most 
grower-processor relationships, the processor has to induce the grower to engage in sev-
eral efforts simultaneously. This raises the question of what the appropriate compensa-
tion method should be used for the inputs provided by growers to processors.  
  The grower´s performance can often be measured fairly accurately in some efforts. In 
others, however, available performance measures that may be used to provide explicit 
incentives to the grower may not even exist. For example, a grower may have to pro-
duce a certain amount of input which is easily measurable, but he may also have to 
make sure that the quality of input is high, which may be more difficult to measure 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2004). As a result, a grower that seeks to maximize his own income 
may not act in the best interest of the processor. This potential conflict of interests cre-
ates a moral hazard problem, which can be resolved or reduced through proper compen-
sation methods. One appropriate methodology to address the moral hazard problem is 
the principal-agent theory (Stiglitz, 1974; Holmström, 1979; Shavell, 1979). In this pa-
per, we construct a normative model using this theoretical framework in which the 
processor,  acting  as  the  principal,  delegates  the  task  of  producing  a  quality-
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differentiated input to the grower.  
  In addition to the grower’s risk attitude and performance measurement problems, 
which are common features in agency theory, there are a few other factors unique to the 
grower’s compensation problem. First, the multiple efforts performed by the grower in 
quantity and quality act jointly to determine the outcome. This is in contrast to, for ex-
ample, a multi-task employee whose tasks are often modelled as additively separable in 
their contributions to the outcome (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Second, the proc-
essor has to consider the trade-off, often present, between the quality of a good and the 
quantity produced, when decides the compensation scheme. In the standard vertical-
product-differentiation model, it is usually implicitly assumed that quality and quantity 
are independent choices (for example, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and 
Sutton, 1982, 1983). That is, at any set level of quality, a grower is free to produce as 
much as he desires. However, in many goods, such as tobacco and grapes, production 
can only be increased at the expense of lower quality. Indeed, the quality-quantity trade-
off is an important research issue that has received substantial attention (see, for exam-
ple, Folwell et al., 2006; McCannon, 2008). It is the feature of inputs for the grower-
processor relationship that is considered here.  
  This paper contributes directly to the substantive literature on multi-task principal-
agent models. In a seminal paper, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) analyzed optimal 
incentive provision in a model in which there were multiple outputs that the principal 
cared about and each of these outputs were functions of a single and different input all 
of which are provided by the agent. Their results show that there are important interac-
tion effects between the incentives given for one task and the agent’s incentives for en-
gaging in other tasks. Later, Ghatak and Pandey (2000) developed a model with a single 
output which was a function of two inputs. They showed that sharecropping contracts 
emerge as a natural solution. In Holmström and Milgrom´s model, it is to encourage the 
agent to produce reasonable amount of all outputs the principal cares about. In contrast, 
in Ghatak and Pandey´s model, it is to encourage the agent to produce a single output 
but induce him to take actions that generate a more favourable probability distribution 
of this single output from the principal’s point of view. Both papers, however, are silent 
on the inclusion of a multiplicative effect of agent’s efforts on the principal’s outcome. 
By taking into account an interaction effect between the ad agency´s various tasks in a 
multiplicative way, Zhao (2005) takes a further step towards investigating the incentive-
based advertising agency compensation. In direct contrast to the findings in the tradi-
tional agency literature, Zhao obtains that when the risk is moderate, the advertiser 
should offer a higher incentive rate as the risk increases.  
  Our  paper  extends  the  previous  multiple-task  literature  to  analyze  the  quality-
quantity trade-off and to study the implications of such a relationship in the principal-
agent framework. One striking finding of our model is that, under appropriate incentive-
based grower’s compensation, the processor may encourage grower’s effort in quality 
without crowding out grower’s effort in quantity, in direct contrast to the findings in the 
traditional multi-task principal-agent literature, according to which incentives must be 
balanced across tasks (Dewatripont et al., 2000).  
  Our paper also contributes to the agency theory methodologically. As discussed ear-
lier, in our model, we study a multi-effort agent, the grower, which is different from 
other multi-task agents (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) in that there is an interac-  2010, Vol 11, (o1  59 
 
tion effect between the grower’s efforts (quantity and quality) in a multiplicative way, 
whereas the majority of multi-task models usually assume an additive functional form 
between tasks. An exception is Zhao (2005). Furthermore, we take into account the 
quality-quantity trade-off, which is not considered in the conventional principal-agent 
models. Why previous models have not included these aspects is likely attributable to 
analytical  problems.  As  Robe  (2001,  p.1)  stated,  “the  history  of  the  principal-agent 
model is replete with frustrations in obtaining not only exact, closed-form, but also nu-
merical, solutions”.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our 
model and explain the key assumptions. We then analyze the incentive-based compen-
sation contract in the third section. We then carry out a simulation exercise to under-
stand the effects of the previous contract in the fourth section. The fifth section con-




  We analyse a vertical structure in which end-markets are differentiated by quality. A 
processor-distributor (the principal) engages a grower (the agent) to produce a good 
considered to be the processor´s input. We suppose that the processor is able to market a 
finished product of an equivalent quality to the grower´s. Likewise, one unit of input is 
needed to produce one unit of output and there is no other input. We further consider 
that there are no raw material processing costs. Although these unrealistic assumptions 
are made for the purpose of analytical simplification, they do not take away from the 
applicability and implications of the model.  
  We aggregate the grower´s efforts into two variables for analytical tractability: quan-
tity, q, and quality, s. It is usually difficult for the processor to monitor the agent´s ef-
forts either because it is too costly to do so or because the processor lacks the expertise 
to valuate the agent´s performance directly. While quantity (q) is perfectly measured to 
the processors, quality measurement by the processor is imperfect and processors´ in-
ability to perfectly observe input quality results in a moral hazard problem. We denote 
by  s  the  level  of  quality  measured  by  the  processor,  according  to:  s s s µ = ,  where 
s µ ~ ( ) s • σ , 1 . The noise term µs captures the underlying uncertainty about measurement 
errors.  
  We assume that the processor is risk-neutral and the grower is risk-averse for two 
reasons. First, the cost of bearing risk is generally relative less for the processor than for 
the independent grower, such as a grower or a farmer (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the grower is less risk-averse than the processor, 
and our assumption is a simplification of this fact. Second, it conforms to the research 
tradition in the agency literature (e.g. Allen and Lueck, 1999; Huffman and Just, 2000; 
Dubois and Vukina, 2004). 
  To model imperfect quality measurement and the grower´s risk aversion, we define 
( ) s q y f ,  as the probability density of the final output, where y is the monetary value of 
the outcome of the output, which depends not only on the finished product quantity, but 
also on the measured quality
1. Depending on the processor’s objective, y can be meas-60  AGRICULTURAL ECO(OMICS REVIEW 
 
ured  in  terms  of  revenues,  profits,  sales,  etc
2.  We  assume  that  ( ) s q y f fq ,   and 
( ) s q y f f
s ,  are increasing in y. This assumption is known as the monotone likelihood-
ratio property (MLRP) of the output function.  
  In general, market prices are higher for high-quality than for lower quality goods. 
Likewise, prices and yields appear to be inversely related in the aggregate market. Then, 
we assume that  ( ) s q f P , = , which satisfies  0 < q P ,  0 >
S P . Our price function is sup-
ported by Beard and Thompson (2003).  
  We need to specify how grower´s efforts in quantity and quality interact to generate 
processor´s revenue. Obviously, the total revenue from the sale of a good is the selling 
price (P) multiplied by the quantity sold. This suggests a positive interaction between 
the two variables in producing processor´s revenue, which means that  ( ) s q y f  must 
satisfy  0 >
s q y . This is in contrast to the substituting effect between multiple tasks stud-
ied by Holmström and Milgrom (1991), who assume that  ( ) ( ) ( ) s g q h s q f y + = = ,  so 
0 =
s q y . 
  The grower´s cost associated with his decisions of ( ) s q,  is  ( ) s q c , = . There is a cost 
associated with effort because it is unpleasant and forgoes the opportunity to undertake 
other activities. The standard vertical-product-differentiation model assumes that the 
cost is increasing in both quality and quantity, convex in quality, and the marginal cost 
of production is independent of quality (McCannon, 2008). To introduce the trade-off 
between quality and quantity, assume instead that the cost of production varies quad-
ratically in line with the given level of quality. That is, cq>0, cqq=0, cs>0, css>0 and 
cq,s>0. This cost function is supported by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Giraud-
Héraud et al. (1999).  
  Although most of our analysis can be carried out by using the general functional 
forms  for  ( ) s q P ,   and  ( ) s q c , = ,  the  exposition  is  significantly  improved  if  specific 
functional  forms  are  used.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  ( ) ( )
2 2 , qs k s q c =   and 
bq s P − = , where k and b are positive constants. These functional forms satisfy all the 
assumptions laid out earlier.  
  The game is played as follows. The processor moves first by offering an incentive-
based compensation contract, w, to the grower, which is contingent on the processor´s 
revenues, i.e.,  ( ) y w w ≅ . The grower decides whether to accept the contract or not. If he 
accepts the contract, he supplies his efforts in quantity and quality, q and s respectively. 
The  grower’s  and  the  processor’s  payoffs  are,  respectively,  ( ) ( ) s q c y w u , − =   and 
( ) y w y − = π . If the grower rejects the contract, he receives the reservation utility, U, 
the minimum that induces him to work, and his payoff is therefore zero.  
  Rather than solving a particular class of contract, we focus on a particular class of 
linear contract: a fixed rent plus a share of the principal’s revenues in the following 
form:  
  ( ) 1 0 , 0 , ≤ ≤ ≥ + = β α β α y y w   (1) 
  We study this class of compensation contract for two reasons. First, it is easy to im-
plement managerially, and, indeed, much economic activity takes place within a frame-
work of incentive contracts, such as managerial compensation (e.g., Lemmon  et al.,   2010, Vol 11, (o1  61 
 
2000; Murphy, 1986), franchising (Lafontaine, 1992, Lafontaine and Slade, 1998), ad-
vertising agencies (Zhao, 2005) and particularly agriculture (Stiglitz, 1974; Newberry 
and Stiglitz, 1979; Otsuka et al., 1992; Lanjouw, 1999; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; 
Roumasset and Lee, 2003). Second, according to principal-agent theory, when contract-
ing is repeated many times and the agent has discretion in his effort, the structure of the 
optimal pay scheme is linear in the principal’s observed payoff (Holmström and Mil-
grom, 1987). This implies a two-part compensation scheme consisting of a fixed rent, 
which is independent of the observed outcome and a share of the observed outcome. 
  Consistent with the mean-variance approach
3, for a risk-averse grower, his net utility 
is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] s q c y w U , exp − − = ρ , where ρ describes the grower’s risk aversion. It 
is  easier  to  deal  with  his  certainty  equivalent
4,  CE,  which  is  given  by 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ,
2 2 2 2
s s q s q c y E CE σ ρβ β α − − + = .  The  term  2
2 2 2 2
s s q σ ρβ   is  the  risk  pre-
mium that the grower demands to compensate for the risk he bears. Since the effects of 
the grower’s risk aversion ρ and the imperfect quality measurement represented by the 
standard deviation σ are not separable in their impacts on the risk premium, we use one 
parameter,  ( )
2 ρσ ≡ R , called the risk parameter, to describe the combined effect of risk 
aversion and uncertainty of measurement in the market.  
 
 
Equilibrium analysis of the incentive-based compensation method 
  When  devising  an  incentive-based  compensation  contract,  the  processor  needs  to 
determine the fixed fee α and the incentive rate β so that the grower will respond to this 
contract through his decisions on quantity and quality in such a way that the processor´s 
net  payoff  is  maximized.  Formally,  the  processor  solves  the  following  problem  to 
maximize his payoff:  
  ( ) { } α β
β α
− − y 1 max
,   (2) 
subject to  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } 2 , max arg ,
2 2 2
,
s q R s q c y E s q
s q
β β α − − + =   (3) 
and 
  ( ) ( ) 0 ,
2 2 2 ≥ − − + s q R s q c y E β β α   (4) 
  Constraint (4) says that compensation to the grower after adjusting for the risk pre-
mium must be no less than its reservation utility to ensure his participation in the con-
tract. If the grower accepts the contract  ( ) β α, , he will determine q and s so that his 
utility is maximized, which is formally constraint (3).  
  With this incentive-based compensation contract, some notable results follow. First, 
the processor chooses an incentive scheme to maximize the joint payoff of the processor 
and the grower (the processor´s gross payoff minus the grower’s cost of effort and risk 
bearing) and both have an incentive to fulfil the contract. Second, the processor com-
pensates the grower for his efforts at a rate that provides partial insurance against in-
come risk. With imperfect measurement on quality, and hence, on grower´s effort in 
quality, the processor does not provide full-income insurance to the grower because that 
would provide weak incentives for effort, leading to shirking. Third, the fixed rent of 62  AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW 
 
the grower is positively related his reservation utility, but his reservation utility has no 
impact on the incentive component.  
  In this sequential-move game, we use backward induction by solving the optimiza-
tion problem in equations (2)-(4). First, we consider the grower’s maximization problem 
in equation (3),  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } 2 2 max arg ,
2 2 2 2
,
s q R qs k bq s q s q
s q
β β α − − − + =   (5) 
  ( ) ( ) 0 2 2
2 2 2 = − − − =
∂
∂
qs R s k bq s
q
CE
β β   (6) 
  0
2 2 = − − =
∂
∂
s q R kqs q
s
CE
β β   (7) 
  Substituting the values of q and s obtained in (6) and (7) in processor’s problem (eq. 
2), and maximizing with respect to β the optimal incentive is obtained. Finally, we cal-
culate
5 
* q , and 
* s  and substitute them into equation (4) to obtain the optimal fixed rent 
* α .  
  A quantitative application of this principal-agent model requires a numerical simula-
tion because it remains impossible to explicitly solve q and s in the equations (6) and 
(7). Thus, a numerical simulation exercise will be carried out in the following section.  
 
 
Simulating and discussing results 
  As  we  mentioned  earlier,  the  multiplicative  functional  form  of  y(q,s)  precludes 
closed-form solutions so we resort to numerical techniques to gain insights
6.  
  In this section, we carry out a simulation exercise with a wide range of scenarios, and 
selected the examples below as being representative of the behaviour we found. We use 
Mathematica
7 to solve the model, and use Excel to draw the graphs using the data pro-
duced by Mathematica. We initially choose the following parameters:  00001 . 0 = b  and 
k=0.4. It should be noted that these initial values are used for convenience and has no 
special significance here and that simulation results do not change substantially if dif-
ferent values for b and k are used. 
  It will be seen below that this framework is able to provide a consistent explanation 
for many issues relating to share contracts. However, before proceeding, we should note 
the caveat that this simulation exercise uses restrictive assumptions about the shapes of 
price and cost functions. Although these seem highly plausible to us for most situations, 
there may be situations which are not covered by our simulations.  
  Essentially, the processor needs to consider three variables when devising the opti-
mal incentive-based method: the grower´s risk attitude, over-all uncertainty in quality 
measurement, and the grower´s reservation utility. As discussed earlier, we set the res-
ervation utility equal to zero. Likewise, since the effects of risk aversion ρ and uncer-
tainty in quality measurement are not separable in our model, we simply use one pa-
rameter, the risk parameter, R, to capture the impact of overall risks.  
  Thus, we have a unique free parameter in our model: the risk parameter, R. For the 
purposes  of  the  simulation,  we  consider  that  R  varies  from  0  to  0.001,  in  steps  of 
0.00005. Still larger values for R do not substantially affect the results of simulation   2010, Vol 11, +o1  63 
 
exercise reported in this section.  
  We start by examining the impact of the risk parameter, R, on the optimal incentive 
share, β*. When quality measurement is perfect (i.e., R.=0), it is easy to check that 
β*=1. That is, the contract would assign all the revenue to the grower. As the risk pa-
rameter increases, the optimal incentive share decreases, as shown in Fig. 1(a). The 
simulation shows that this general pattern holds for the full range of the risk parameter
8. 
Indeed, if the quality measurement is infinitely imperfect (i.e., R•∞), then we obtain 
that β*=0 and the optimal pay scheme is a fixed salary equal to the certainty-equivalent 
utility (i.e., w=α*=0). In this case, the processor optimally bears all the risk because he 
is risk neutral and less risk averse than the grower. This finding of the incentive share 
corroborates  the  traditional  agency  literature  (e.g.,  Hueth,  2000;  Huffman  and  Just, 
2000).  
  As the risk parameter increases, the effectiveness of incentives diminishes and hence, 
the grower is less motivated to make an effort in quantity. This can be seen from Fig. 
1(b) that there is an inverse relationship between incentive share and quantity effort. 
And the result about the quality effort is qualitatively the same as in the previous one. 
That is, the grower’s effort moves in tandem with the incentive share, as shown in Fig. 
1(c). Therefore, the optimal choice is to decrease the supply of both efforts when the 
risk parameter decreases.  
  A corollary to the results of this numerical simulation is that, with an incentive-based 
compensation contract, the incentive share is effective with both grower’s efforts.  
  We can further draw some conclusions regarding the impact of the risk parameter on 
the total certain equivalent. This can be seen from fig. 1(d) that an increase in the risk 
parameter results in a decrease in the total certainty equivalent.  
  The previous results suggest discussing the implications of our theoretical findings 
and comparing this incentive-based compensation method with the traditional multi-task 
principal-agent model.  
  It is well known that incentives are an effective means to address the moral hazard 
problem  in  a  multi-task  principal-agent  relationship.  However,  incentives  work  in  a 
much complex way in the grower-processor relationship in a differentiated market than 
in other relationships. In addition to the grower´s risk attitude, overall uncertainty (in 
this case, imperfect measurement) and several efforts, which are common to all multi-
task agency problems, the interactive effect between quantity and quality and the trade-
off between them are factors that will affect the efficacy of incentives. These latter two 
features  are  unique  to  the  processor´s  problem  compensation  when  he  is  concerned 
about quality. Because of these new features, some established findings in the multi-
task principal-agent literature do not necessarily  hold in our grower’s compensation 
problem.  
  In particular, the standard result of multi-task principal-agent theory requires that the 
incentives must be balanced across tasks. For example, if the different tasks are com-
plements at the margin in the principal’s payoff function, i.e., if it is important for the 
principal that the agent engages in all tasks rather than concentrating his efforts on a 
single task, it is optimal for the principal to use low-powered incentives on the well-
measured task compared to a situation where the agent is engaged solely in this task. 
The reason is that if the principal offers high-powered incentives for a task that is easy 
to measure and low-powered incentives for a task where measurement is difficult, then 64  AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW 
 
the agent will focus his efforts on the task that is rewarded and the other task for which 


















































































































  (c)  (d) 
Figure 1. Compensation contract with respect to risk parameter 
 
  However, for our grower´s compensation problem, we find that, a unique incentive 
share is sufficient to incentive the grower to allocate his effort in the two tasks, quantity 
and quality. Qualitatively, this finding could corroborate the result found by Laffont and 
Tirole (1990). These authors argue that one can find conditions under which a manager 
should be rewarded only on the basis of total profit or cost, even though more disaggre-




  This paper uses the principal-agent theory to analytically investigate the optimal in-
centive-based compensation contract that a processor should offer to a grower perform-
ing efforts in quantity and quality. In this process, we contribute methodologically to the 
multi-task  principal-agent  literature  by  including  a  quality-quantity  trade-off  and  an 
agent performing multiple efforts that produce outcomes in an interactive way.  
  When designing a compensation contract based on this model, the processor has to 
take into account the interaction effect of the quantity and quality on the outcome and 
the inverse relationship between quantity and quality. One striking result of these effects 
is that the processor should offer a contract with a unique incentive based on the ob-
served outcome, in direct contrast to the findings in the traditional multi-task agency 
literature.  
  One of the implications of the incentive-based method is that, as grower´s income is   2010, Vol 11, +o1  65 
 
directly related to the outcome of the quality, it is reasonable to assume that the grower 
has a strong voice in how the quality effort is formulated and executed. The processor 
may be forced to give the grower free rein in determining how the quality should be 
handled. However, in many real-word contracts between processors and growers, out-
come-based  contracts  are  not  used  in  isolation,  but  in  combination  with  input-
monitoring. A convincing evidence of this statement is present in viticulture, where 
many wineries exert a direct control over vineyard activities by specifying input use 
such as the choice of irrigation technology employed. Clearly, the less the winery im-
poses on the grower the more responsibility the grower has for the outcome of the qual-
ity (Fraser, 2003). Thus, it could be helpful to both the processor and the grower to put 
the compensation issue in the larger perspective of quality management of the relation-
ship between the two.  
  The present study has certain limitations that need to be taken into account when 
considering the study and its contributions. However, some of these limitations can be 
seen as fruitful avenues for future research under the same theme. 
  The analysis presented here leaves unanswered an interesting question in contracting. 
Holmström (1979)´s classical work about imperfect information in a problem of moral 
hazard proves that “a signal is valuable if and only if it is informative”. According to 
this proposition, the uncertainty in quality measurement led us to choose a compensa-
tion scheme based on the principal´s revenue. But later papers have suggested that if 
some aspects of the agent´s performance cannot be contracted, relying on subjective 
performance evaluation and voluntary bonus payments might be optimal (for example, 
MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 
2004). Hence, there would be the possibility that an input-based contract could be more 
efficient second-best contract compared to the outcome-based contract by using subjec-
tive quality evaluation.  
  Another primary limitation of this analysis is that it is not a dynamic analysis, al-
though in practice, processors tend to contract repeatedly with the growers whom they 
rely on. Then, it does not consider the possibility of a relationship between principal and 
agent over time, and hence, it does not take into account reputation effects of insincere 
behaviour. However, previous literature has proved that reputation can be an added in-
centive mechanism to induce performance under a contract (King, Backus and Gaag, 




1  In this paper “quality” is not perceived quality but objective (technical) quality 
2  When the principal has a greater potential to impact on retail demand due to branding 
revenue sharing contracts are better to provide appropriate incentives that profit shar-
ing contracts (Rubin, 1978). In this case, as there are no processing costs, it is indif-
ferent. 
3  The linear mean-variance utility function is routinely used, especially in agriculture 
(e.g., Chavas and Holt, 1990; Pope and Just, 1991; Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Allen 
and Lueck, 1999)  
4  The optimal choice for a decision maker faced with uncertainty is the maximization 
of his expected utility where the expected profit and variance are the arguments of 66  AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW 
 
utility. As the expected utility derived from variable profits is equal to the utility de-
rived from the certainty equivalent, CE, the maximization problem can be mathe-
matically written as  ( ) 2
2
π ρσ π − = E CE , where the coefficient (ρ ≥0) measures the risk 
aversion and σ
2
π is the variance of profit (Robison & Barry, 1987).  
5  Let the Nash equilibrium values be denoted as *.  
6  In contrast, the additive functional form prevalent in the conventional multi-task prin-
cipal-agent models will yield closed-form solutions.  
7  The Mathematica commands are available from the authors on request. 
8  The results of all the other values of the risk parameter proved are available from the 
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